THE U.S. FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
ACT 1976-A PLAN FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION
By
KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI *

THE Fishery Conservation and Management Act of April 13, 1976,
which took effect on March 1, 1977, undertook to revise an important
aspect of U.S. international relations in a period when the law of the
sea was in flux, and a new public order of the oceans was in the making.
Although enacted exclusively in response to the urgings of national
interests, and as an emergency measure, it demonstrated a feeling and
perception of trends and developments in the realisation of the broader
needs of the international community at large. In addition, experimenting with a unilateral approach to the process of international
law-making, the Act has demonstrated its usefulness, while at the same
time drawing a line on its application. Assuredly, there are still important hurdles to take before the Act, as a programme of diplomatic
action, is a total success; but even at this moment it seems to have
added an important initiative to American activity in the international
arena.
The most important provisions of the 1976 Fishery Conservation and
Management Act are fairly simple. The Act extended the exclusive
authority of the United States in regard to fishery management by
200 miles, calculated from the baseline from which the American
territorial sea is measured, in respect of all fish within the zone. It also
included, under the protection of the U.S. conservation and management authorities, all anadromous species (salmon) wherever found (even
those outside the fishery conservation zone) and applied that protection
to them throughout their migratory range, except where this included a
conservation and management zone within the territorial waters of
another State, provided that the U.S. had recognised the foreign
conservation and management zone in question. Finally, the Act also
included all continental shelf fishery resources, even those outside the
200-mile limit. It prohibited all foreign fishing of the protected species
except in accordance with its provisions. Fishing permits will be issued
to domestic and foreign fishermen, following a procedure established
by the Act and upon payment of fees.
Until late in the inter-war years, U.S. fishermen had to compete
almost exclusively with their geographic neighbours.'It was not until
1937 and 1938 that a large number of Japanese fishermen appeared off
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the Canadian and U.S. Pacific coast, harvesting salmon and causing
considerable concern over the possible depletion by foreign fishermen
of Pacific salmon, which for some time had been an object of domestic
conservation policies.'
Japanese intrusion into an area which American fishery interests
regarded as their own was paralleled after the war by the activities of
foreign fishing fleets off the Atlantic coast. A good example of this
competition of foreign fishermen with American fishing interests is
seen in the New England fishing grounds. Before 1960, the George
Bank fishing area was exploited almost exclusively by United States
fishermen, with the exception of a few Canadians who represented
virtually no competition to Americans. In 1961, Soviet fishing fleets
appeared and reported taking 68,000 tons of fish off the George Bank.
By 1965, Soviet exploitation had expanded south to Chesapeake Bay
and the Soviets' catch reached over one-half million tons, far in excess
of the United States catch. By 1970 several other countries had joined
in fishing off the U.S. coasts and the foreign take grew to more than
one million tons, far in excess of the allowable harvest recommended
by the scientific estimates of the available fish stocks. As a result, the
U.S. share began to decline. In 1972, American fleets took only about
2
12 per cent. of the total catch off the Atlantic coast.
The real meaning of these events in terms of the U.S. economy may
be seen in the following figures. In the period since 1938, when Japanese
fishermen appeared in the Bristol Bay area, world landings of fish have
trebled, while U.S. landings rose in aggregate from 4.3 billion pounds
in 1938 to 5.3 billion in 1969, at which time demand for fishery products
in the United States was rising steadily, but declined again to 4.7 billion
pounds in 1973. In fish and fishery products, the 1973 adverse balance
of payments amounted to $1.3 billion-an increase of 318 per cent.
compared with 1960.1
In 1973 the United States fishing industry landed only 4.4 billion
pounds taken from U.S. coastal waters. 4 While landings decreased,
consumption of fishery products in the United States nearly doubled in
the past two decades. This increase in demand, coupled with decreasing
American landings led to an increase of imports between 1959 and 1973
from 1.75 billion pounds to 5.5 billion. 5
The haddock is a particular example of the over-fishing of seas off
American coasts. The annual catch of haddock off the George Bank
averaged 120 million pounds until Soviet fishing flotillas began operating there and then the catch by New England fishermen fell to 11 .7
1 Allen, the Fisherg Proclamation of 1945 (45 A.J.I.L. 177 (1951)).
2 Marine Fisheries Act of 1975: Report, H.R. 445, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. 34 (1975).
3 H.R. Report 445, supra n. 2, at 32, 9949.
4 Department of Transportation Coast Guard, Study of Coast Guard Enforcement of
200-Mile Fishery Zone (May 1976) at 111-2-3.
5 Ibid. 31-32.
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million pounds. The American consumer continued to buy haddock,
which now comes imported and frozen.' In New England, cod, hake,
pollock, ocean perch, lobster and herring, as well as haddock, have
been over-fished to the point of commercial extinction, within only the
last 20 years.' The yellowtail flounder, which is not the primary commercial fish stock in New England, has been so over-fished that the
National Marine Fisheries Service has indicated that the overall catch
may have to be reduced by 50 per cent. in some parts of the ocean.
Other threatened species in this area include mackerel, flounder,
halibut and herring. On the west coast, the Alaskan pollock is gravely
over-fished, and foreign fishing of this species is at least 200,000 tons
over what it should be. In addition, Pacific halibut, salmon, mackerel
8
and hake have all been taken to the point of near extinction.
The striking feature in the process of deterioration of marine life in
American fishing grounds is the rapidity of that process. Most of the
damage was done in the course of the last decade or so. At the same
time, negotiations for a new comprehensive law of the sea treaty, which
would prevent over-fishing and establish a world-wide system of conservation and management, is painfully slow and, at the moment when
the Congress decided to act in defence of American fishing interests,
such an agreement was not even in sight. A report which the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee submitted to the House Committee
concluded that:
While gladly conceding that an inevitable goal must be the reform and increased
sophistication of international law ... the Committee is resolute in its con-

viction that the time required to effect needed adjustments in the area of
international law is such as to make the conservation of many fish stocks and
the welfare of our domestic fishing industry
almost moot unless immediate ...
9
action is taken without further delay.
The initiative for the regulation of international fisheries came from
the Congress itself. Bill H.R. 200, which was eventually adopted as the
1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act, was introduced in
the House by a group of 25 congressmen. In addition, there were 13
identical and four similar bills introduced by individual members of the
House. This legislative venture into the realm of U.S. foreign relations
was congressionally conceived, and the set of measures to achieve the
purpose of the Act was designed almost exclusively within the legislative
branch of the Government.
The proposed legislation was strongly supported by the Eastern
seaboard States and equally strongly opposed by California. It was felt
that while the proposed Act might effectively protect the interests of the
fishing industry in the east and the salmon fishery on the western coast,
6 H.R. Rep. No. 152, 94th Congress, 1st Sess. at 9949.
7 H.R. Rep. 445 (note 2) at 9927; S. Doc. No. 189, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 23074 (1975).
8 Ibid. 36; S. Doc. 189 23074.
9 Ibid. 612.
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it might jeopardise the interests of western fishermen, who relied
considerably on the fishery resources in foreign waters.
The other complexity which the Congress had to face and resolve,
was the resolute opposition of the Executive. During the hearings on
the bill the House consulted the departments of Commerce, State,
Interior, Justice, Treasury, Defence and Transportation. House requests
were referred to the National Security Inter-agency Task Force on the
Law of the Sea, which raised important objections to the bill. These
may be briefly summarised as follows:
(1) The U.S. was engaged in negotiations in the Law of the Sea
Conference, and the passing of the Act would jeopardise the
chances of securing a multilateral fishery r6gime.
(2) Unilateral action was contrary to international law and would
recognise similar jurisdictional claims by others, prejudicing
distant waters fishing by American fishermen.
(3) Serious foreign policy problems would result if other nations
engaged in distant waters fishing refused to recognise American
claims to control fisheries off the American coasts.
(4) The Bill was at variance with the U.S. proposals submitted to the
Law of the Sea Conference in regard to the two-hundred-mile
economic zone necessary to protect the interests of all States
and of the international community as a whole, particularly in
regard to dispute settlement and the levying of fees to cover the
cost of regulating international fisheries.
As the House Report indicates, Congressional policy was directly
opposed to the line followed by the Executive:
As a matter of policy, for the last several years the United States has been
adamantly opposed to any extension of fishery jurisdiction beyond 12 miles. In
fact the Executive Branch of the Government has generally supported the

principle of unlimited freedom of the seas as being in the best interest of the
Nation. This is attributable to strong naval interests, the need to import large
amounts of energy and raw materials by water, and distant water fishing
interests, notably tuna and shrimp.

American foreign policy regarding the protection and regulation of
international fisheries was "the so-called ' species ' approach, designed
to assert no geographical fisheries jurisdiction."
The Report continued:
Under this proposal coastal nations would be given regulatory jurisdiction over
coastal and anadromous species of fish, together with preferential rights to such
fish up to the level of their capacity. The actual limit of coastal jurisdiction over
these species would be determined by their location, not by any arbitrary line.' 0

Although born in opposition to the Executive's approach in regards
to the protection of American fishing interests, the Act follows the main
10 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1976. Vol. 2, P.L.
94-265. 90 Stat. 331 pp. 595 et seq. 16 U.S.C. 1812.
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objectives of the foreign policy pursued by the Executive branch of
Government. This is due primarily to the fact that the American
position in the Law of the Sea Conference had undergone a substantial
modification, because of the rapidly changing aspirations of individual
States.
While the intention of the United States Government was to establish, jointly with other nations, fishing off the United States under a
conservation and management regime, other countries went ahead and
unilaterally established exclusive fisheries zones, extending in most
cases for 200 miles. By 1974 there were about 40 such zones, thus
indicating a definite trend in international approach to the conservation
of fisheries programme. This development was not without influence
on the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. In effect, the
Informal Single Negotiating Text, which reflected a general consensus
on many points among the majority of the participants in the Conference, included the provision that coastal States shall control fishery
resources in an area extending 200 miles from the coast.11
As a result, the United States delegation changed its position regarding conservation.' 2 On July 11, 1974, Ambassador Stevenson, the chief
American delegate, declared the new line of U.S. policy to be supportive
of the idea of the 200-mile economic zone:
we are prepared to accept, and indeed we would welcome general agreement
on a 12-mile outer limit for the territorial sea and a 200-mile outer limit for the
economic zone, provided that it is a part of an acceptable comprehensive
package, including a satisfactory r6gime within and beyond the economic zone
and provision for unimpeded transit of straits used in international navigation
... to the extent that the coastal nation does not fully utilise a fishery resource,
we contemplate coastal nation's duty to permit foreign fishing under reasonable
coastal State regulations .... 11
...

The change in the U.S. policy line has not removed the opposition to
unilateral action in regard to the regulation of international fisheries
which the proposed bill was aiming to achieve within the Congress
itself. As a result, an interesting debate ensued.
Supporters of the Bill relied on the fact that there is a community of
some 40 nations which have taken a unilateral step and established an
economic zone or exclusive fishing rights zone extending far beyond the
12-mile limit permitted by the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone. 14 Comfort was taken in the fact that the
Single Negotiating Text proposed the establishment of the 200-mile
economic zone. 15
In the brief submitted by the Department of Justice, it was argued
11 United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Single Negotiating Text, InternationalLegal Materials, 682 (1975), § § 45-46.
12 See, H.R. 445 supra n. 2, at 599.
13 Ibid.
14 Representative Leggett, 121 Cong. Rec. H 9916 (1975).

15 122 Cong. Rec. H 121 (1976).
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in favour of unilateral extension that State practice does not conform
to the existence of the maximum breadth for exclusive fishery zones;
that most States have not protested against broad claims made by other
States to fishery zones; that the Single Negotiating Text worked out at
the Third Law of the Sea Conference was evidence of the developing
norms of international law, and that proposals at the Third Law of the
Sea Conference relating to the 200-mile economic zone stressed coastal
"sovereign rights." It was argued that precedents exist in American
practice of unilateral action, particularly in the area of fisheries utilising
the Truman declaration, and the 1966 unilateral U.S. extension of the
fisheries jurisdiction to 12 miles. 16
Opponents of the Bill responded that international custom did not
authorise a unilateral extension of fisheries. Claims of other States to
broad areas of fishery jurisdiction had met with protests, including
those of the United States. Finally, proposals emanating from the Law
of the Sea Conference were not international law-certainly not before
they are adopted.' Regarding the Truman Proclamation, it was argued
that its force was limited to areas where only Americans fished, and
applied only to them. Any conservation regulation for foreign nations
had to be negotiated. The 1966 extension of fisheries to 12 miles was
authorised by the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.' 8 ,
Opposition came also from the ranks of American professors of
international law. In their opinion, customary international law did not
support a unilateral extension of fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles. 9
There was some discussion in the Senate of the import for the
proposed legislation of the judgment of the International Court of
Justice in the Icelandic Fisheriescase. The opponents of the bill quoted
the language of the opinion of the International Court indicating that
Iceland's extension of control over the fishing grounds to the extent of
50 miles off its coast, was incompatible with the rights of others to fish
in those waters:
A coastal State entitled to preferential rights is not free, unilaterally and
according to its own uncontrolled discretion, to determine the extent of those
rights. The characterisation of the coastal State's rights as preferential implies a
certain priority, but cannot imply the extinction of the concurrent rights of other
States-particularly of a State which, like the Applicant [Great Britain] has for
many years been engaged in fishing in waters in question-such fishing activity
being important to the economy of the country concerned. The coastal State
has to take into account and pay regard to the position of such other States,
particularly when20 they have established an economic dependence on the same

fishing grounds.
16 122 Cong. Rec. H 9930 (1975).

17

122 Cong. Rec. H 9916 (1975).

18 122 Cong. Rec. H 262 (1976).
19 121 Cong. Rec. H 9916 (1975), 122, 262 (1976).
20 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom and Northern Ireland v. Iceland (1974)
l.C.J.Rep. 27-28).
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The question considered in Congressional argument was whether the
holding of the Icelandic Fisheries case could be limited to the situation
in which another country with an "established economic dependence
on the same fishing grounds "was involved. In the case itself, the Court
focused on the fact that Great Britain had been fishing in Icelandic
waters for centuries. The proponents of the Bill limited the relevance
of the case to situations in which a fishing country had " historic
rights," which none of the countries affected by the 1976 Act-U.S.S.R.,
21
Japan and Poland-could establish.
The last major point of controversy in Congress was over the validity
of the 1976 Act in the light of existing international agreements. Section
201 of the Act allows foreign fishing pursuant to an international
fishery agreement, if such agreement is in effect at the date of enactment
of the Act or has not expired, been renegotiated or otherwise ceased to
be in effect with respect to the United States.
The proponents of the bill argued that current fishery agreements
were still in force, due to the provisions of section 201. The opponents
of the bill charged that it contravened the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High Seas and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone. This is true specifically with regard to Article 2 of
the Convention on the High Seas, which expressly guarantees freedom
of fishing. This argument was countered by the argument that the
underlying premise of Article 2 of the Convention is that fishery
resources are inexhaustible. While this may have been true in 1958, it
is not true today, when depletion of the fishery resources by modern
fishing methods is a fact. Secondly, it was contended that the Geneva
Conference of 1958 reached no agreement on fisheries preservation and
jurisdiction, and that these questions were left open to be resolved by
the Third Conference. 2 Thirdly, it was argued that the 1976 Act was
constitutionally in order, since according to the doctrine of Whitney v.
23
Robertson, an act of Congress supercedes an earlier treaty.
Another argument of the opponents of the Bill was that, according
to Article 24 (2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, both zones were limited to 12 miles and that no
jurisdiction of any nature could be exerted beyond that point. Again
the answer was that this Convention had nothing to do with fisheries
24
control.
Viewing the general trend in the changing world arena, particularly
in regard to the Law of the Sea, Congress adhered to a certain set of
theories which justified a unilateral approach to management and
conservation policies as having a legitimate place in the system of
21 121 Cong. Rec. H 9923.
22 121 Cong. Rec. H 9930 (1975).
23 121 Cong. Rec. S 2307 (1975).

24 Ibid.
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international law. In essence it resulted in determining the function of
the unilateral action taken by the coastal State, and its relationship to
international agreements dealing with fishing rights of other nations.
The basic idea in the Congressional understanding of the international law agreements is that owing to the absence of central authority,
international law relies, to a large degree, on the principle of reasonableness as applied to claims of members of the international community.
In the Senate, the author of a treatise on the Law of the Sea was cited
in support of this proposition:
The law of nations, which is neither enacted nor interpreted by any visible
authority universally recognised, professes to be the application of reason to
international conduct. From this follows that any claim which is admittedly
reasonable may fairly be presumed to be in accordance with law and the burden
that it is contrary to law should be on the State which opposes the
of proving
22
claim.

In the House, the justification for a new approach was founded on
the conviction that new fishing technology required a total re-appraisal
of international rules dealing with the fishing rights of individual membtrs of the international community.
For well over 300 years, one of the most basic principles of the freedom of the
seas has been the freedom of fishing. That is, States have generally claimed, and
been accorded, relatively narrow limits of jurisdiction, and fishermen have had
free and open access to all stocks on the high seas (outside the territorial waters
of coastal nations). In these international waters, no single State or group of
States has had a right
26 to exclude others from freely exploiting these common
property resources.

This approach worked well until modern technology created a real
danger of over-fishing the oceans. In particular, this affected more
desirable species of fish. Recent experience of the United States had
forced the Congress to take action to protect the interests of American
fishermen and the effectiveness of conservation efforts of the American
Government in co-operation with other governments.
In order to achieve these objectives, the purpose of U.S. Government
action had to be differently defined, and the concept of international
law, and the role of individual States in relation to each in connection
with national and international conservation efforts, had to be redefined. In effect, Congress adopted the idea that nations which have
undertaken action in order to conserve the existing stock of fish should
be able to control certain sea areas and to enjoy priority in exploiting
available resources.27
The central point of the Act is legislative determination of the roles
played by unilateral action compared with the function of international
agreements in developing international law. The Act recognised the
supremacy of international agreements over an act of a national
25 Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea (1959), at 29. Cong. Rec. S 23079 (1975).
27 Ibid. at 617.
26 H.R. 445 (note 2) 596.
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legislature. In consequence, the 1976 Fishery Conservation and
Management Act is destined eventually to be replaced by international
agreement, when it is achieved and has entered into force. 2 At the same
time, Congress acknowledged the futility of earlier efforts to establish
a working conservation and equitable management r6gime by means of
international agreements. Unilateral American action, however, is
legitimate only when it is expressive of the already existing trends in the
development of international law. In support of this policy, the House
Report cites the report of the National Advisory Committee on Oceans
and Atmosphere:
The major new challenge is fisheries management. Instead of the living resources
of the sea belonging to no one, a world consensus is developing which would
place the exclusive jurisdiction of most fisheries and other living resources with

the coastal nation. For the United States, with one of the longest coastlines of
any nation and some of the richest fishing areas of the world ocean, this virtual
ownership of vast fisheries resources ... presents 29a new opportunity for our
people and new responsibility for our government.

Traditionally, American government refrained from regulating fishing
in the seas under American jurisdiction. Prior to recent times, the only
prohibition against foreign fishing was contained in the Nicholson Act
of 1793, limiting fishing within the three-mile territorial sea to United
States vessels enrolled for the fisheries. 30 In the mid-1960s the Bartlett32
31
Act was adopted, followed by the Exclusive Fisheries Zone Act.
These two Acts extended the exclusive fisheries jurisdiction of the
United States from 3 to 12 miles, and prohibited foreign fishing for
crawling marine life on the continental shelf of the United States. In
1970, Congress again took action to strengthen the penalty provisions
of the Bartlett Act. 33 On this occasion the report to the House stated:
These two Acts initiated the intense Congressional effort to convince the
Department of State and successive administrations that vital national resources,
our fisheries and our fishing industry, are in grave danger. Each of these many
steps has been resisted, and whenever possible frustrated.

The only thing that has been achieved by the administration was the
conclusion of a number of bilateral fisheries agreements, predominantly
with nations which historically never fished in American waters. The
pattern of these agreements was to induce these nations to refrain from
fishing in designated waters beyond the exclusive fisheries of the United
States (12-mile zone) during particular seasons which are of the greatest
importance to American fishermen. In exchange, the U.S. Government
grants work privileges and a variety of other concessions. However,
28
29
30

Ibid. at 612.
Ibid. at 612.

40 U.S.C. § 251 (a) (1970) (corresponding to Coasting and Fishing Act of 1793,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 305).
31 Act of May 20, 1964, Pub. Law 89-308, Stat. 194 16 U.S.C. 1981 et seq. (1970).
32 Act of Oct. 1966, P.L. 89-658 § 3, 80 Stat. 980 16 U.S.C. 1091-94 (1970).
33 Act of Oct. 27, 1970, P.L. 94-265, 384 Stat. 1297, L6 U.S.C. 1081 et seq. (1970).
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these newly-fishing nations have never agreed to desist from fishing in
American coastal waters, nor do they allow American inspectors on
board their vessels to monitor their activities regularly, without advance
notice. Foreign partners to such agreements have also refused to
recognise the reality of the fact that fishery resources are exhaustible,
except in return for concessions from the United States which would
make foreign fishing even more successful, such as the right to re-supply
in American ports rather than at home, thus avoiding long trips to and
from the fishing grounds.
In those circumstances direct intervention into the agreement-making
process became necessary. It was inevitable that Congress should
determine the goals and purposes of diplomatic action by the Executive
and State Department in particular.
At the same time the 1976 Act is founded upon the conviction that a
unilateral approach is not in conflict with the international law in force.
It is, indeed, sanctioned by international law:
International lawyers view the law of the oceans as a process "of continuous
interaction; of continuous demand and response," a developing system whereby
unilateral claims are put forward, the world community
weighs the claims and
4
then such claims are either accepted or rejected."

The usual process is to negotiate bilateral or general international
agreements. However, unilateral action may initiate a trend of change.
An example of such an action, directly connected with the Congressional initiative leading to the enactment of the 1976 Fishery Act was
the Truman declaration of September 28, 1945, 3 concerning Coastal
Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas. This launched the idea that
the United States claims the right to regulate and control fishing
activities in the high seas contiguous to its coast in order to establish
conservation zones in the areas where substantial fishing activities have
86
developed or may develop.
In practical terms, the Act provided also for the pattern of renegotiation of international agreements, which in the past determined
U.S. relations with nations fishing off the U.S. coasts. The general
directive regarding the aims of future international fishery agreements
is that their purpose is to give effect to the substantive provisions of the
Act. This was not always possible in the past, as the State Department
and its negotiators, in demanding concessions from fishing nations,
found themselves at a disadvantage compared with those who could
rely on the freedom of the oceans. In these negotiations, neither the
Congress, nor the American fisherman had a role to play. 37
The main reason for the shortcomings of the hitherto-followed
34 H.R. 445, supra, n. 2, at 597.
35 Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, 59 Stat. 885 (1945).
36 H.R. 445, supra, n. 2, 597-598.
37 Ibid. at 627.
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routines, which frustrated the policies pursued by the Congress, was
that, in the context of international agreements, oversight procedures
were completely inadequate. While some of the fishery agreements
followed procedures established by Article II of the Constitution
(ratification with the advice and consent of the Senate) most of the
fishery agreements were concluded without the previous consent of
Congress:
The role of Congress has been limited, by reason of the decision not to submit
such agreements to the ratification process ... oversight is after the fact and in

a climate which is not conducive to meaningful probate of what should have
been accomplished in the negotiations versus what was actually agreed to, in
order to insure that the utterly bankrupt negotiating procedures of the past
decade are not repeated after the enactment of this Act .... Il

The 1976 Act not only sets up the policy, but prescribes a new
negotiating process in which supervision of the negotiated agreements
is assured, in spite of the fact that fishery agreements made pursuant to
the Act are still executive agreements.
Under Section 202 of the Act, no fishery agreement may be made
after May 31, 1976, or renewed after June 1, 1976, unless it conforms
strictly to the protective provisions of section 201 of the Act.
Compliance with the fishery agreements concluded under the r6gime
of the Act is assured by the Congressional oversight procedures, which
follow practices already established in the Trade Act of 1974 and the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.31
According to the scheme established in the 1976 Act, no fisheries
agreement shall become effective before the close of 60 calendar days of
continuous session of Congress after the submission by the President
of the text of the agreement, both to the House and Senate-provided
that neither House shall adopt a rdsolution of disapproval.
This applies to the bilateral fishery agreements, such as those made
with Japan, Russia and Poland, as they relate to fishing for certain
species of fish in the 12-mile exclusive fishery zone. In other words, the
purpose of the negotiation or renewal would be to extend the provisions
of these bilateral agreements to the 200-mile zone, and at the same time
to provide for enforcement of the provisions of the Act in regard to the
allocation of quotas, issue of permits, control of compliance and civil
and penal sanctions.
In addition, in order to bring agreements into line with the Act, the
Act requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary
of Commerce, immediately after the coming into force of the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, to renegotiate all treaties concluded in the manner prescribed by Article II, section 2 of the Constitution, which pertain to fishing within the fisheries zone or to species,
38 Ibid.

39 Ibid. at 628.
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stocks of fish or fisheries with respect to which the United States may
exercise management and conservation authority under the Act.
In this last class of treaties, three groups of fishery agreements must
be distinguished.
The first are those dealing with fish or fisheries which, according to
the Fishery and Management Act, were placed under United States
jurisdiction. This included three groups of fish: fish, stocks of which
were to be found within the 200-mile zone; continental shelf fish; and
anadromous fish, including those found during their migration cycle
outside the 200-mile zone. Two such agreements are those specifically
aimed at the International Convention for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 40 and the International Convention for the High Sea Fisheries of
41
the North Pacific Ocean.
The second group of agreements which must be negotiated with
foreign countries are those protecting the rights of American fishermen
to specific stocks of fish within the 200-mile zones of the coasts of foreign
nations. Typically, the Report quotes the shrimp fishery off the coast of
Brazil. 42 To strengthen the hand of the Secretary of State in inducing
foreign governments either to negotiate or to respect their obligations,
the Act provides that, in the case of refusal or non-compliance, the
Secretary of State shall certify the fact and notify the Secretary of the
Treasury who will subsequently prohibit the importation of any seafood
product from such a country into the territory of the United States.
However, this procedure excludes seafood products and fish harvested
43
by United States vessels.
Finally, the Secretary is required to renegotiate international conventions concerning highly migratory species. Specifically, this means
the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (IATTC) 44 and the International Convention on the
45
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
The main problem with these three groups of conventions is the
enforcement of conservation measures aimed at assuring the optimum
sustainable yield (OSY) of the stock of fish obtainable in controlled
areas. Congress developed the concept of the OSY, as opposed to the
concept of the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). In order to define
what is meant by the term OSY, the Report gives the example of
haddock:
An example of such a situation has occurred in the Northwest Pacific where

mindless overfishing for haddock has virtually wiped out the species. A zero
quota for haddock will not permit that species to restore itself since other
40 Ibid. at 624. 1 U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S. 157 (1949).

41 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 (1952).
42 H.R. 445, supra, n. 2, 628.
43 Ibid. at 624-625.
44 1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3 (1949).
45 20 U.S.T. 320, T.I.A.S. 6767, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (1969).
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fisheries in the North-west Atlantic cannot be conducted without taking
haddock. Accordingly, the harvest of these other species must be reduced below
their MSY to reduce the incidental catch of haddock.16

In this respect the management activities of the International Commission established by the International Convention for the Northwest
Atlantic (ICNAF) came under sharp criticism in Congressional
1
hearings.4
Another example of the failure of international management of
fishery resources arises in the case of herring. According to the testimony
of Dr. Anthony Vaughn, the Deputy Chief of the Northeast Fisheries
Center of the National Marine Fisheries Service, and a member of the
herring working group of ICNAF, catches of herring in excess of quota
for 1972 and 1973 were caused by the INCAF's inability to control the
fishing of the German Democratic Republic, not then a member of
48
ICNAF.
The reason for the failure of international fishery conservation
schemes is the fact that enforcement of conservation measures, particularly regarding undersized and protected fish, is left to each signatory
nation as regards to its own citizens:
For example, the Congressional Report states, if a Soviet fleet is operating off
U.S. shores pursuant to an international agreement, it is the duty of Soviet
officials to enforce that agreement on their citizens. It is easy to see, however,
why a nation, which on the one hand has directed its fishing fleet to return a
high quota of fish may not be as diligent
as is necessary to enforce full com49
pliance with international agreements.

A somewhat different problem requires renegotiation of the provisions
of the tripartite (U.S., Canada and Japan) High Sea Fisheries of the
North Pacific Convention, concluded in 1952 to protect salmon
fisheries. It introduced the doctrine of abstention:
The essence of the ... treaty is that where one or more nations have engaged
in the intensive research of a specific coastal fishery, have subjected it to conservation regulation and are making approximately maximum use of it upon a
sustained yield basis, then, in the interests of maximum world food production
and in light of equitable and peaceful international relationships, other nations
which have not participated in such research, regulation or previous exploitation
should recognise these conditions and agree to restrain their nation from
participating in such fishery.5 0

Under that doctrine, Japan agreed to abstain from fishing for salmon
east of the 175th west meridian. At that time, it was thought that this
would provide adequate protection for salmon stock spawning in
American and Canadian rivers. However, it has been shown that salmon
range far beyond this boundary line, and Japanese fishermen, owing to
their advanced fishing technology, are able to catch large numbers of
46 H.R. 445, supra, n. 2, 615.
47 Ibid.

48 State of Maine et al. v. JuanitaKreps et al., 563 F. 1043 (1977), n. 2.
49 H.R. 445, supra, n. 2, 610.

" Allen, "A New Concept for Fishery Treaties" (1952) 45 A.J.I.L. 319, 321.
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salmon after they reach the abstention line. Thus it became necessary to
provide for the protection of salmon beyond the 175th west meridian.
The question was whether the 1976 Act was a proper answer to this
problem. The move to establish the 200-mile conservation and management zone raised fears in the salmon industry that this would prompt
the Japanese to denounce the treaty and to fish for salmon up to the
limits of the zone, thus adding pressure on the salmon stock, which
until now was harvested by American salmon fishing boats. The
counter-argument was that other fish, rather than salmon, available
within the zone were more important to the Japanese diet and fisheries
industry, and that therefore the U.S. had a negotiating leverage with
which to protect high sea salmon in return for fishing privileges in the
zone for other species."
A little more than a year has passed since the 1976 Fisheries Conservation and Management Act came into effect (March 1, 1977). The
period between the enactment and the coming into force was used by
the Administration to bring about compliance by the partners of the
U.S. with the Act's provisions.
The initial step was to establish limits and boundaries of the Fisheries
Conservation Zone, and here co-operation with other States was
essential.
On March 1, 1977, the State Department sent to the Federal Register
the geographic co-ordinates of the fishery conservation zone around the
U.S. and its territories and possessions. The establishment of the fishery
conservation zone created maritime boundaries with Canada, Mexico,
the Soviet Union, the Bahamas, Cuba, The Dominican Republic, the
Netherland Antilles, Venezuela, the British Virgin Islands, Tonga,
Western Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and various
islands in the Pacific Ocean which are under the jurisdiction of the
United Kingdom or New Zealand. Their determination was particularly
urgent in the case of Canada and Cuba, and was achieved in a comparatively short period of time.52
With Cuba, a modus vivendi was reached on April 27, 1977. Cuba
accepted the provisional delimitation as proposed by the American
53
side.
As regards U.S.-Canadian relations concerning fisheries, the reciprocal fishing agreement in certain areas of the United States and
Canadian coasts, signed in Ottawa on June 15, 1973, 54 was extended in
April 1976 55 and provided a temporary basis for the relations between
two neighbours whose co-operation, in regard to the protection of
fishery resources, was of long standing. Negotiations between the two
51 H.R. 445, supra, n. 2, 607, 611. See also H.R. 152, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 9943,
(1975).
52 Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 76, 273-274.
53 Ibid. 504, Vol. 78, 62.
54 T.I.A.S. 7676.
55 T.I.A.S. 8251.
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countries had a more ambitious goal than those with other countries
seeking fishing privileges off the coast of the United States. On February
24, 1977, the two countries signed a new Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement
to permit the continuation of fishing by the fishermen of both countries
off their coasts. This agreement took into account the fact that both
partners extended their fishery jurisdiction over ihe 200-mile zone. 5
This was only an interim arrangement. A far broader agreement is in
the process of negotiation, including a scheme of co-operation between
the U.S. and Canada in the programme of conservation. It is planned
that negotiations will create a joint fisheries commission with separate
panels for the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, composed of members
appointed by the respective governments. Fish stock would be divided
into three categories: stock that is to be managed jointly, stocks
managed jointly following the proposals submitted by the country
with a primary interest, and independent management of stocks subject
only to consultation.57
U.S.-Canadian boundary negotiations also regulate the access to oil
and gas resources in the boundary areas. Negotiators have proposed to
establish share-access zones, with each country sharing equally in the
available oil and gas reserves. 58
On fishing rights in the U.S. Fishery Conservation and Management
Zone of other countries, bilateral agreements have played the main role.
At the present time, the U.S. has concluded bilateral agreements
permitting access to fisheries off American coasts with the following
63
62
countries: Spain,5" Poland,60 Korea,61 East Germany, Soviet Union,
Republic of China (Taiwan),64 Bulgaria, 65 Mexico, 66 Cuba, 67 and
68
finally the European Economic Community.
In this series of bilateral agreements, that with EEC presents certain
special problems. Not all the EEC members have traditionally fished
off U.S. coasts. Only France, Italy and West Germany have visited
American fishing grounds in the past. Since, however, the Community
has adopted a common fishery policy and at the same time has established its 200-mile Conservation and Management Zone, an agreement
with the EEC as such was unavoidable.
While the Agreement theoretically applies to all members of the EEC,
fishing rights are granted in the first place to those of its members who
have fished in American waters in the past.
Throughout the negotiations with the Community, the United States made it
clear that it understood that the Community now has a common fisheries policy
Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 76, 274.
58 Ibid.
60 T.I.A.S. 8528.
62 T.I.A.S. 8527.
64 T.I.A.S. 8529.
66 Ibid. 352.
56

68 T.I.A.S. 5838.

57
59
61
65
65
67

Ibid. 856.
T.I.A.S. 8523.
T.I.A.S. 8526.
T.I.A.S. 8528.
Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 76, 327.
Ibid. 578.
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and that the objective of the negotiations was to accommodate the interests of
the three member States which traditionally have fished off our coasts. The
United States retains the right through the domestic process of approving
applications and issuing permits, to determine who shall fish off our coasts.
Until such time as the fish stocks ... rebuild, and even then only when they are
in excess to the harvesting capacity of the U.S. fleet, we do not expect to allocate,
or to approve application for, any country that has no record of traditional
fishery. For this year, clearly, permits will be available only to France, Italy and
the Federal German Republic ... ".9

The importance of the agreement to the United States was in the fact
that ".... approximately 100 U.S. shrimp trawlers fish in waters off
French Guiana which lie in the EEC Zone." 70 In addition to gaining
recognition of the U.S. Fishery Zone, the EEC agreement also fulfilled
the purposes of the other Act defining a foreign policy objective, i.e. the
protection of the interests of the American distant waters fishing fleet.
In the same category is the agreement on American shrimp fishing
with Brazil of March 14, 1975, which took effect on Match 1, 1977. 71
Another major negotiating objective set up by the 1976 Fishery Act
was the fishery agreement with Japan, on which the future of the
salmon fishery depended. Basic in this connection was the Tripartite
(U.S., Canada and Japan) International Convention for the High Seas
Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean of May 9, 1952, which set up a
conservation r6gime for salmon with the participation of the three
powers involved.
In course of time, as the American fishery jurisdiction was expanded
from three to 12 miles, the North Pacific Convention was supplemented
by additional agreements with Japan, including the Agreement of
December 24, 1974,72 and the Agreement of the same date relating to
salmon fisheries.73 These two agreements were replaced by an Agreement of February 10, 1977, which concerned fisheries off the coasts of
the United States, and covered the period of transition, until an effective
r6gime of conservation and management of fishery resources was
established. Submitting this agreement to Congress for oversight procedures, the Executive Branch simultaneously submitted for information
74
an initial draft of a long-term agreement covering the 1978-82 period.
To assure international acceptance of the 1976 Fishery Conservation
and Management Act by the nations fishing off the American coasts,
U.S. diplomacy had relied until now exclusively on the instrument of
bilateral agreements. Fishery agreements with interested parties have
effectively replaced the International Convention for the Northwest
Atlantic, and indeed the U.S. Government withdrew from that
69 Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 76, 177.

70 Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fishery Affairs, February
22, 1977; ibid. 273.
71 T.I.A.S. 8253.
72 T.I.A.S. 7586.
73 T.I.A.S. 7787.
74 Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 76, 178-179, 273, 427.
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Convention, restricting its interest in regard to fishing in the area
outside the 200-mile zone.75
The Tripartite Convention of 1952 (Japan, Canada and the U.S.)
has remained in force, although again the bilateral approach (Salmon
Fishery Agreement with Japan) may prove to be an adequate substitute
for the multilateral approach. The question remains whether adequate
protection of salmon from over-fishing in the high seas outside the
200-mile zone off the Pacific coast may be assured by means of a
bilateral understanding between the U.S. and Japan. Certainly, a
multilateral r6gime with the participation of the most important fishing
nations would seem to represent a more effective method. This again
stresses the interim character of the measures enacted by the U.S.
Congress.
The Department of State representative, reporting on February 3,
1977, to the Sub-committee on Oceans and International Environment
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, confirmed that this was
indeed the understanding of the State Department in regard to the
intent of Congress as expressed in the Act:
..in passing the Act, Congress made clear its intention that the United States
should continue to pursue its interests in the law of the sea negotiations, including the fisheries interests. We ...have sought a balanced r6gime which
would give us the desired control over our coastal stocks, protect the interests of
our distant-water fishermen, and provide for national conservation and management of all fisheries resources.
While most of the attention given to the Act has been in the area of our
coastal interests, the Act also makes clear that the United States as a matter 7of6
policy and law, intends to protect its interests off the coasts of other countries.

Bilateral negotiations seem to have succeeded in assuring access to
shrimp fisheries off the coasts of other countries. Protection of other
American interests (tuna fishing, and sport fishing for other highly
migratory fish) by means of bilateral agreements seems less certain.
Multilateral approaches, whether leading to the revision of existing
conventions, or the working out of a universal scheme, seem to be more
promising.
The Act of 1976 stabilised Congressional oversight procedures in
regard to the international agreement-making power of the Presidency,
inasmuch as it is not subject to the requirements of Article II, section 2
of the Constitution. This aspect of the Congressional initiative and its
further sophistication continues the practice established by the Case
Act, adopted in 1972, which instructed the Secretary of State to...transmit to the Congress the text of any international Agreement, other

than a treaty, to which the United States is a party as soon as practicable after

such agreement has entered into force with respect to the United States but in
no event later than thirty days.... 7
76 Ibid. 80,
76 Ibid. 176.
77 P.L. 92-403 U.S.C. See i12b 86 Stet. 619.
"
28 i.c.L.Q.-6
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The 1974 Trade Act carried Congressional oversight a step further.
Section 121 (c) of that Act provided that, whenever the implementation
of a trade agreement entered into pursuant to that section (trade
liberalisation) would effect a change in any provision of federal law or
administrative procedure, the agreement must be submitted to Congress
so that it may pass implementing legislation, unless Congress explicitly
delegates such implementing authority.7" Obviously, in the case of
non-compliance with section 121 (c), the agreement has no effect, until
Congress takes steps and passes the required legislation.
The 1976 Act goes even further. It requires all agreements made
pursuant of the foreign policy goals to be submitted to Congress before
coming into effect.
The Act continues the trend towards expanding Congressional
control over foreign policy, in two directions. In the first place, Congress
as such claimed successfully the prerogative to make foreign policy, to
determine its goals and prescribe a modus operandi in their realisation.
In the second place, it also retained the right to supervise and check
whether international agreements made under Congressional statutory
authorisation are in compliance with its terms. As a result, it checked
the growing tendency to expand the Executive prerogative in the area
of foreign policy.
It is true that Congressional venture into the area of foreign policymaking, as exemplified in the Trade Act and Fishery Act, concerns
commerce with foreign nations (Article 1, Section 8 (3) of the U.S.
Constitution), but at the same time it represents a trend away from the
doctrine of executive agreements formulated in a number of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, of which Belmont 19 and Pink 80 are perhaps
most significant. The two Acts raise up in a new form, though in a
restricted sense, the ideas of the Bricker amendments, proposed by the
Senator of Ohio to place limits on international agreements and their
legal effect on domestic matters. 81

.78 P.L. 93-618, 89 Stet. 1378 (1975).
79 U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 329, 570, 80; U.S. v. Pink, 391 U.S. 203.
80 U.S. v. Pink, 391 U.S. 203.

81 See Sutherland, "The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements and Imported
Potatoes," 67 Harv.L.Rev. 281 (1953).

